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Abstract
Panel data on 54 developing countries between 1960 and 2000 are used
to investigate how the impact of opening to trade on economic growth is
affected by wealth inequality. The results suggest (a) that opening to trade
tends to accelerate growth but (b) that the addition to growth depends
inversely on the level of wealth inequality prior to opening. These findings
confirm the general importance for rapid growth in developing countries of
reducing inequalities of opportunity.
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1 Introduction
The links between inequality and growth and between trade and growth have
attracted much attention from economists. Many papers have addressed these
two issues separately (for instance, Attanasio and Binelli, 2003; Krueger and Berg,
2003). Other papers have asked whether greater openness to trade has increased
inequality in developed and developing countries (Anderson, 2005; Goldberg and
Pavcnik, 2007). Morrissey et al. (2002) link all three issues, concluding that the
interaction between income inequality and trade liberalisation has no effect on
growth.
A neglected aspect, however, has been the effect of inequality on the extent
of the gains from trade. Inequality of wealth and asset ownership, in particular,
has been argued to affect the incentives of and constraints on economic actors,
especially poor ones. Variation among countries in the distribution of wealth
could thus plausibly be hypothesised to affect both the benefits and the costs of
opening to trade and therefore to be a cause of variation in the growth outcomes
of trade reforms. The objective of this paper is to refine and test that hypothesis.
The model developed in this paper focuses on the fact that people at the lower
end of the distribution of wealth ownership have very limited access to credit.
While credit market imperfections have been analysed extensively in the inequality
and growth literature1, they have played little role in studies of the effects of trade
liberalisation (McCulloch et al., 2002) and even less in the literature on trade
and growth. Thus, this paper also highlights new aspects of the role of financial
1Inequality has also been found to affect growth through the political economy, social and
political instability and health channels, however this last one is more debated in the literature
(see Deaton, 2001).
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development.
The main findings are as follows: opening to trade leads to faster economic
growth. But the addition to growth depends inversely on the level of wealth
inequality at the beginning of the liberalisation process. The suggested reason is
that in countries with more wealth inequality fewer people are able, by borrowing,
both to take advantage of the opportunities created by trade liberalisation and to
adjust to the economic disruption that it causes.
Section 2 sets out a simple model of the relationship between the distribution of
wealth and the outcome of trade liberalisation. Section 3 explains the methodology
used to test this theory. Sections 4 and 5 present and discuss the data, the results
and some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
In what follows, we present a model in which capital-market imperfections restrict
borrowing and lending. As shown in the literature on inequality and growth, this
implies that when the individual production function is concave, greater inequality
in the distribution of wealth results in a lower aggregate level of output and, in
an endogenous growth model, a lower rate of growth. The novelty of this paper
is to extend this framework to compare how economies with different degrees of
wealth inequality fare following a trade liberalisation. Because, in a more unequal
economy, more individuals will be below a certain threshold level of wealth, the
net benefits of opening to trade will be lower. This implies that trade liberalisation
will exacerbate the differences in output levels or growth rates among countries
with different levels of inequality, even though all countries individually will gain
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from the liberalisation.
Closed-economy model
Our model follows Aghion et al. (1999). Aggregate output y does not depend,
as in the standard model, merely on the aggregate stock of capital k, i.e. yt =
f(kt), where this stock is the simple sum of the capital stocks of all producers,
kt =
∑
i ki,t. Instead, aggregate output is the sum of the output generated by
each producer, yt =
∑
i yi,t, which in turn depends on her own capital stock,
yi,t = f(ki,t). With capital-market imperfections, f(
∑
i ki,t) and
∑
i f(ki,t) are
different, which implies that the distribution of wealth affects the aggregate level
of output.
Aghion et al. consider an economy in which all agents are identical except for
their ownership of wealth. Agent i, where i ∈ [0, 1], invests an amount of broadly
defined capital ki,t at time t. The definition of capital is widened to include those
cumulable factors of production whose markets are imperfect, and therefore human
capital particularly. This is used in production according to
yi,t = Atk
α
i,t, (1)
where 0 < α < 1, implying that the productivity of individual investments de-
creases with the scale of the investment. At is the level of technical knowledge
available in period t and common to all individuals. The premise, as in Grossman
and Helpman (1991), is that knowledge is non-rivalrous and is also non-excludable
in many respects. Aghion et al. endogenise the level of technology by assuming
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learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers. While the former concept implies that
the more one produces, the more one learns, and hence the greater the level of
technical knowledge, the latter implies that the more learning one agent does, the
greater the return from the overall level of technical knowledge for every agent in
the economy. These two assumptions are summarised in the following equation,
At =
∫ 1
0
yi,t−1 di = yt−1. (2)
Thus, the stock of knowledge at any time depends on past aggregate production.
The rate of growth for the closed economy (superscript c) between period t − 1
and period t is given by
gct = ln
yt
yt−1
= ln
∫ 1
0
Atk
α
i,t di
At
= ln
∫ 1
0
kαi,t di. (3)
Therefore, the rate of growth depends on the distribution of individual investments.
The more concentrated these are on a few large investments, the lower is the growth
rate. Growth would be faster with a larger number of smaller investments.2
To see how these investments are determined, consider that there is one com-
posite good, made up of a continuum of unspecified goods j ∈ [0, 1], that can be
used as both capital and consumption good. There is a continuum of infinitely-
lived individuals i and no population growth. The utility of each individual is
2This result is the consequence of decreasing returns to scale to individual investments, while
increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level imply a growth effect rather than the classical
level effect.
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given by
Ui,t =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ci,t, (4)
where ci,t denotes consumption of individual i at time t and 0 < β < 1 is the
discount factor. Individuals differ in their initial endowments of wealth, wi,t, which
are randomly determined at birth, with mean 1.3 At any time, each individual
can consume her endowment or invest for future consumption, where production
and technology follow the process described in the previous paragraph. It is this
investment that enables the economy to grow, so that the more is invested (or,
equivalently, the less is consumed), the faster will be the economy’s growth.
In the absence of capital-market imperfections, all agents invest where ki,t = k
?
t ,
i.e. to the point where the marginal product of capital is equal to the rate of
interest. This is possible because agents with different endowments can lend and
borrow capital freely. As a result, aggregate output and growth do not depend
on the distribution of wealth. Conversely, when individuals cannot borrow nor
lend because of capital-market imperfections, individual investments are simply a
fraction of individual wealth, ki,t = s · wi,t.4 Individual outputs are then given
by yi,t = At(s · wi,t)α, and the rate of growth is determined by the distribution of
endowments,
gct = α ln s+ ln
∫ 1
0
wαi,t di. (5)
3This normalisation implies that the growth rate g does not depend on the unit of k.
4This is the result of a dynamic programming exercise in which each individual maximises
utility subject to the individual production function. If the discount factor, β, and the returns
to the individual capital investments, α, are assumed to be equal for all individuals and constant
over time, the savings rate, s, can be treated as a parameter. Mathematical derivations are
provided upon request.
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It is clear from equation (5) that Aghion et al.’s model predicts that when there
are decreasing returns to individual investments, greater inequality in initial en-
dowments and, therefore, in individual investments implies lower aggregate output
and a lower rate of growth for a given aggregate amount of investment.
Effects of openness
We now move beyond Aghion et al., to analyse the effects of trade liberalisation in
this model, and in particular to show how the gains from trade and the adjustment
costs of trade are intertwined.5 The context is a general neoclassical model of trade
with m factors and j goods. Ordering the j goods by factor intensity and following
the theorem of comparative advantage, as specified by Dixit and Norman (1980),
one can predict which country will produce and export which goods depending
on their relative costs of production. As a corollary, trade allows a country not
to produce a range of the unspecified goods j at high cost and instead to import
them more cheaply.
The gains from trade are a result of broadly defined structural change, i.e. the
displacement of existing inputs, outputs, techniques and even firms by new and
better ones (McCulloch et al., 2002). Such gains from greater openness, defined
as the reduction in barriers to cross-border economic interactions, are particularly
important for developing countries because their goods and technologies are often
far inside the world frontier. Some of these structural changes involve the replace-
5Ventura (1997) builds a model where more openness to trade increases growth by combining a
weak form of the factor-price-equalization theorem developed by Trefler (1993) with the Ramsey
model of economic growth. The result is that international trade converts excess production of
goods into exports, instead of falling prices. This model has features that complicate its expansion
to include heterogeneity in terms of individuals’ levels of wealth and it makes predictions about
the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski effects that go beyond the aim of this paper.
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ment of production for the domestic market by imports (and a corresponding shift
of domestic production capacity into exports). This is the classic source of gains
from trade through intersectoral reallocation and is reflected in changes in trade
flows.
However, many of the structural changes are ‘behind the border’, involving
a wide range of shifts in product mix, techniques and industrial structure that
increase productivity without directly affecting on trade flows. In some cases,
these shifts even prevent changes in trade flows, as with ‘defensive innovation’,
suggested by Wood (1994) and formally analysed by Acemoglu (1999), Neary
(2002) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003). The increase in competition from foreign
firms following a trade liberalisation may lead home firms in import-competing
sectors to invest in more efficient techniques and capital in order to keep foreign
goods out of the domestic market. Greater openness generates more structural
change and more gains than would be predicted simply from increases in trade
flows.
The link from medium- to long-run faster growth following trade liberalisation
is then provided by knowledge spillovers, as described above. In a more open
economy, these spillovers could also include such things as technological transfer
and learning from imports. For instance, Ben-David and Loewy (2000) argue that
the extent of the international transmission of knowledge between two countries is
determined by the level of their trade.
The gains from trade through structural change can be summarised in the
following extension of equation (2) above
At = (1 + γδ)yt−1, (6)
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where γ is the ratio (> 1) of the productivity of new activities to that of old
activities, which is assumed for simplicity to be the same for all sorts of structural
change, and δ is the proportion of domestic production that is affected by structural
change as a result of greater openness. For any given γ, which can vary among
countries, the gains from trade increase with δ.
Inequality and investment
We assume that agents affected by any structural change following a trade lib-
eralisation at time t, who are a proportion δ of all agents by construction, are
required to invest a lump-sum amount f to acquire the information and know-how
needed to switch production and, thus, to reap the benefits of trade liberalisation.6
Because capital-market imperfections restrict borrowing and lending, individuals
must finance these lump-sum investments from their endowments. They thus have
to choose whether to invest in reaping the gains from greater openness, taking into
account that this would reduce their wealth to wi,t− f or simply to use all of their
endowments wi,t for consumption.
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Given the capital-market imperfections, this choice will depend on the individ-
ual’s level of wealth. To discover exactly how it depends on wealth, we use dynamic
optimisation to calculate the level of consumption with and without the lump-sum
investment – assuming At is constant because an individual does not internalise
spillovers (details are provided upon request). Comparing the two optimal levels
of consumption yields the cut-off level of wealth, wˆi,t, at which an individual is
6For sensible results, f must be smaller than the average level of wealth w¯t.
7Since this is a lump-sum investment, it only affects the decision of whether to invest or not,
but, conditional on investing, it does not change the returns to ki,t, so that the proportion of
(net of lump sum) wealth invested is still s, as in the original model.
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indifferent between investing and not investing in new information and know-how,
which is
wˆi,t = fˆ =
f
1− 1−β
1−βα
. (7)
The cut-off level of wealth is unsurprisingly an increasing function of f . Also
unsurprisingly, fˆ is a decreasing function of β, because greater patience (a higher
β) makes investment more attractive relative to current consumption. It is less
obvious why fˆ is an increasing function of α, but this can be understood in terms
of substitution and income effects. A higher α, on the one hand, implies that
future consumption is cheaper relative to present consumption, but, on the other
hand, implies that the discounted future income stream is higher. Since agents
cannot borrow or lend and, thus, cannot take advantage of the substitution effect,
the income effect has to prevail, which reduces the incentive to invest.
The distribution of wealth is assumed to be such that a proportion λ of individ-
uals affected by structural change – and hence a proportion δλ of the population
– has a level of wealth below fˆ , and will thus choose not to invest. This pro-
portion λ will be greater, ceteris paribus, in countries with greater inequality of
initial wealth endowments. Agents affected by structural change who have a level
of wealth above fˆ – a proportion δ(1−λ) of the population – will make the lump-
sum investment of f and invest a proportion s of their remaining wealth in order
to reap the benefits of trade liberalisation. Agents who are not affected by the
structural changes, a proportion 1− δ of the population, do not need to make the
lump-sum investment to enjoy the benefits of trade liberalisation and will keep
investing a proportion s of their wealth.
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Open-economy model
Combining these new elements with the model in equation (5), the growth rate in
the open economy (superscript o) becomes
got = ln(1 + γδ) +α ln s+ (1− δ) ln
∫ 1
0
wαi,t di+ δ(1−λ) ln
∫ 1
fˆ
(wi,t− f)α di. (8)
This extended model predicts not only that less unequal closed economies grow
faster, but also that economies with lower inequality will grow faster after opening
to trade because larger proportions of their populations will be able and willing to
invest in new productive activities. In addition, open economies will grow faster
than closed economies, provided that the net gain from trade is positive. Assuming
that δ is randomly distributed across the population, the net gain from trade can
be easily calculated: the costs from opening to trade are given by the proportion
δλ of the population that ceases to invest and produce, while the rest of population
gains higher returns on their investment given by (1 + γδ). Thus, the net gain is
equal to [(1 + γδ)(1 − δλ) − δλ], which is larger when λ is smaller, i.e. the less
unequal is the distribution of endowments. The net gain from trade is positive so
long as the productivity differential is large enough to outweigh the adjustment
costs (which need not always be the case).
To summarise, the model implies that trade liberalisation will trigger adjust-
ment processes resulting in faster or slower growth depending on the initial dis-
tribution of wealth.8 This is obviously not the only mechanism by which trade
8This paper does not take into account Stolper-Samuelson feedback effects from trade to
income inequality, because what matters is wealth rather than income inequality. Also, this
paper excludes the existence of further feedback effects running from income to wealth inequality
because they are only visible in the very long run, as suggested by Wood and Ridao-Cano (1999).
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reform could affect growth, but the extent to which it can explain differences in
the growth response to trade liberalisation is what we will now try to assess.
3 Econometric specification
The method to be applied is cross-country and panel data regressions. In particu-
lar, panel data may provide valuable insights by exploiting the time-series nature
of the relationship between trade, growth and wealth inequality and allowing us
to control for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
Serious criticisms have been aimed at growth regressions (eg. Hausmann et al.,
2005). This paper analyses only one of the many possible influences on growth,
but cannot entirely escape these criticisms. Errors of omission could be particu-
larly important, especially with regard to measures of institutions, as stressed for
example by Rodrik et al. (2004). Thus, an important part of this paper will be to
run a series of robustness checks taking these issues into account.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita output. Independent
variables include two alternative measures of openness to trade, a measure of the
inequality of wealth (land ownership inequality) and interactions between open-
ness and wealth inequality. The regressions also control for the amount of land
per person and the average level of education (a proxy for human capital), both
measured at the beginning of each period to avoid endogeneity.9 Investment is
not included, because of its endogeneity and its close accounting relationship with
growth. To include investment, moreover, would cause the regressions to miss the
9In our robustness checks, we also include interactive variables between our measures of
openness and land per capita, but this does not change our main results and, thus, this is not
discussed further.
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point of this paper, which is that inequality of wealth ownership lessens the effect
of trade on growth by reducing investment (see Frankel and Romer, 1999). Also,
this paper does not consider any convergence effects both because this is not a
feature of our theoretical model and because per capita GDP at PPP at the be-
ginning of the period is not significant in our regressions neither with Pooled OLS
nor with difference and system GMM estimators. A further measure of wealth in-
equality, education inequality was used in preliminary empirical work but has not
been included because of its almost perfect collinearity with the level of education
(the correlation, ρ, is at least −0.92 for all the periods considered).10,11
Initial estimating equations for the cross-section and panel data would thus be
respectively:
gi = a+ b1oi + b2li + b3hi + b4σi + b5oiσi + ei (9)
git = a+ b1oit + b2lit + b3hit + b4σit + b5oitσit + b6yrt + ui + eit (10)
where g is the growth rate of per capita output, o is a measure of openness to trade,
l is the average amount of land per person, h is the average level of education,
σ is the distribution of land, o · σ is the interaction between openness to trade
and the distribution of land, yr are the period dummies for the panel data, e is
the error term (for the panel data it is the time-variant part of the error), u is
the time-invariant part of the error term for the panel data and the subscript i
10Education inequality was measured by the Gini coefficient at the beginning of each period
and taken from Thomas et al. (2002).
11This high correlation is due to the fact that, unlike for other factors of production, individuals
can hold only up to a certain amount of formal education. This implies that as a country
experiences an expansion of average levels of education, this benefits more those individuals
with lower levels of education, which implies, in turn, that inequality in educational attainment
decreases.
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represents each country while t stands for each time period.
Estimating these initial equations by OLS and, for the panel data, pooled OLS
(POLS) poses several problems. Firstly, our measure of land inequality is collinear
with the average amount of land per capita (ρ = 0.55). Using a weighted Gini
coefficient of land inequality – multiplying land inequality by land per capita for
each country – eliminates this problem. Moreover, this weighted measure of land
inequality gives more weight to those countries where land inequality relative to
other wealth inequalities matters more, i.e. those developing countries where land
is more abundant and, therefore, a more important factor of production.
Secondly, as noted already, the omission of institutional variables may lead to
omitted variable bias. However, regional dummy variables will be included to take
into account regional institutional characteristics and, thus, reduce this problem.
In addition, we control in further regressions for country’s institutional charac-
teristics, using two measures of institutions, including the settlers’ mortality rate,
developed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) as an instrument for investment-discouraging
institutions.
Thirdly, there is an extensive empirical literature on the endogeneity of some of
the regressors used in this paper, and, in particular, measures of openness and the
level of education. The trade dependency ratio, tdr, is alleged to be affected by en-
dogeneity bias mainly because of reverse causality (faster growth, ceteris paribus,
implies a higher level of income, which may stimulate a disproportionately higher
level of trade). Reverse causality is also a cause of endogeneity bias when estimat-
ing the effect of education on growth. Moreover, Frankel and Romer (1999) criticise
the Sachs-Warner Index for endogeneity on omitted-variable grounds (countries
with free-market trade policies may also have free-market domestic policies that
14
increase growth). While this source of bias is mitigated by the inclusion of regional
fixed effects, we test the extent of this problem while performing our robustness
checks.
In addition, and particularly for purposes of estimating the present model, the
trade dependency ratio is affected by attenuation bias related to measurement er-
ror. More specifically, changes in the trade dependency ratio are a noisier measure
– i.e. measured with greater error – than changes in the Sachs-Warner Index of the
true extent of structural change caused by trade barrier reduction. One reason for
this is the defensive investment argument outlined in Section 2: trade flows reflect
only part of the full structural change caused by a reduction in trade barriers,
and a part whose relative importance is likely to vary among countries and time
periods. Another reason is that the trade dependency ratio can vary as a result
of shocks that are unrelated (or not closely related) to structural change, such as
fluctuations in export or import prices (eg. an export commodity price boom will
push the ratio up) and movements of exchange rates (eg. the impact effect of a
devaluation is to raise the measured ratio of trade to GDP even if no real variable
alters). Thus, the trade dependency ratio is a downward-biased measure of the
true extent of structural change and one should expect the Sachs-Warner Index
and its interaction with land inequality to have larger effects on growth.
To correct the endogeneity biases, we use an instrumental variable (IV) esti-
mator for the panel data with the lagged values of the endogenous variables as
instruments. This approach cannot be employed for the cross-section data, which
will be analysed using OLS to provide a starting point for the analysis of the co-
efficients. For the IV approach to work, the instruments, i.e. the lagged values of
the measures of openness and the level of education, need to be both informative
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and valid. For the instruments to be informative, all that is required is that they
are correlated with the endogenous variables. This is definitely the case since the
correlation values are above 0.8 for all the variables and periods considered. For
the instruments to be valid, they must also be uncorrelated with the residual in
the main equation determining growth. This seems to be the case because, from
a purely historical perspective, there should be no reverse causality from growth
at time t to any of these variables at t − 1, provided that there is negligible se-
rial correlation in the error term. However, the model as specified below is exactly
identified and, thus, it will not be possible to test for the validity of the instruments
used.
The final estimating equations for the cross-section and panel data are thus
respectively:
gi = a+ b1oi + b2wσi + b3hi + b4oiσi + b5ri + ei (11)
git = a+ b1oit + b2wσit + b3hit + b4oitσit + b5ri + b6yrt + ui + eit (12)
where wσ is the weighted distribution of land and r represents the dummy variables
for geographical regions.
The choice of estimators will be OLS for the cross-sectional analyses, but is
more complex for the panel data. The underlying endogeneity assumption that
leads us to the use of IV can be tested with the Hausman specification test. Yet,
the estimators for the panel data will differ in terms of the underlying assump-
tions about the error terms. While random effects (RE) estimators assume that
the unobserved effects are not correlated with the regressors, fixed effects (FE)
estimators assume that they are correlated and, therefore, eliminate these unob-
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served effects by differentiation. Once again, the Hausman specification test will
be used to examine whether FE or RE should be preferred. However, if the time-
invariant part of the error term is indeed uncorrelated with the regressors, RE will
be efficient only when the variance of this time-invariant part of the error term is
different from zero, meaning that there is serial correlation. Otherwise the POLS
estimator should be preferred because, unlike the RE estimator, it does not require
the regressors to be strictly exogenous. In this case, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier test can be used to investigate the presence of serial correlation.
4 Data sources and description
The data cover 54 developing countries, chosen according to the availability of
reliable data, and listed in the Appendix. The analysis is limited to developing
countries because, as observed in Section 2, developing countries are more likely
to benefit from structural change because they usually are further inside the world
production frontier, and also because developed countries have been open to trade
according to the Sachs-Warner Index for a long time and, thus, one would need
to go much further back in history to find some different evidence (consistently
with these reasons for their exclusion, the inclusion of developed countries yields
less clear econometric results). The period in both the cross-section and panel
data analyses is 1960-2000, divided into 5- and 10-year sub-periods in the panel
data. Table 1 provides the definitions and sources of variables and table 2 presents
summary statistics for the cross-section (averaging across all years) and the panel
data.
The growth rate of per capita real GDP (growth), in percentage terms, is
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Table 1: Description and source of variables.
Description Source
growth Growth rate of pc real GDP, annual %, period average Penn World Table
swi Sachs-Warner Index, period average Wacziarg & Welch, 2003
tdr Trade dependency ratio, period average Penn World Table
land Average area of land per person, initial level Frankema, 2006
educ Average schooling years for pop. over 15, initial level Barro & Lee, 2001
landgini Gini coefficient for land distribution, initial level Frankema, 2006
wlandgini Weighted landgini, initial level, landgini×land Derived
swiland Interaction between landgini and swi Derived
tdrland Interaction between landgini and tdr Derived
Table 2: Summary statistics for cross-section and panel data, 1960-2000.
Cross-section 10-year Panel 5-year Panel
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
growth 2.08 1.66 -0.70 6.72 2.08 2.63 -3.80 16.96 2.08 3.35 -6.55 31.02
swi 0.38 0.29 0 1 0.38 0.44 0 1 0.38 0.46 0 1
tdr 0.33 0.21 0.06 1.11 0.33 0.25 0.04 2.17 0.33 0.26 0.03 3.00
land 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14
educ 2.85 1.71 0.12 7.25 3.90 2.08 0.12 9.93 4.04 2.11 0.12 10.56
landgini 63.48 16.49 29.10 90.90 63.48 16.38 29.10 90.90 63.48 16.36 29.10 90.90
wlandgini 1.03 1.20 0.00 5.84 1.12 1.37 0.00 8.33 1.12 1.36 0.00 8.85
swiland 24.25 18.98 0 71.40 24.25 29.72 0 86.50 24.25 31.33 0 90.90
tdrland 19.84 12.13 4.68 57.32 19.84 14.34 1.73 114.84 19.84 14.79 1.12 159.05
Note: Cross-section (N=54); 10-year period Panel data (N=216, n=54, T=4); 5-year period Panel data (N=432,
n=54, T=8).
measured by the average value of the annual growth rates in the relevant period
and is taken from Heston et al. (2006) (Penn World Table). This variable is
comparable across periods and countries as it is measured at PPP.
Two measures of openness are used. The first one is the Sachs and Warner
(1995) Index (swi), which is equal to 0 if the country is closed and 1 if it is open.
The assessment of openness takes into account tariff rates, coverage of non-tariff
barriers, black market exchange rate premium, state monopoly of exports, and
socialist system. The data are average values in each period, from Wacziarg and
Welch (2003). The second measure of openness to trade is the trade dependency
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ratio (tdr) – which is equal to the sum of exports and imports divided by PPP
GDP. This variable is also taken from Heston et al. (2006).
The amount of land per person (land) is calculated at the beginning of each
period by dividing the total amount of land (area), measured in thousands of
hectares and taken from Frankel and Romer (1999), by the total population (pop),
measured in thousands of people and taken from Heston et al. (2006). The level of
education (educ) is calculated as the average years of schooling for the population
over the age of 15, measured at the end of the year preceding the beginning of each
period to avoid problems of endogeneity, and is taken from Thomas et al. (2002),
who, in turn, make use of the Barro-Lee dataset (2001).
The distribution of land (landgini), which is used as a proxy for wealth in-
equality, is measured by the Gini coefficient at the beginning of the whole period,
which implies that in the panel data the same observation is repeated for each
period, and is taken from Frankema (2006). This is preferred to Deininger and
Olinto (2000) because of its broader country coverage and to Vollrath and Erick-
son (2007) because it calculates the land Gini coefficient in a way that is more
comparable with other studies.12
As mentioned in Section 3, the average level and the measure of dispersion for
land are combined in the final specification to give weighted Gini coefficients for
land distribution. One thus obtains the following variable, the weighted Gini coef-
ficient for land distribution (wlandgini) measured at the beginning of each period
12Using land inequality as a proxy for wealth inequality may be criticised on the grounds
that, if a country is made up of heterogeneous lands in terms of productivity, under competitive
land rental market and free entry, this will result into land inequality but no wealth inequality
because lower-productivity lands will give rise to larger holdings (Eastwood et al., 2004). While
this problem can be solved by regressing land inequality on average farm size, taken from Vollrath
(2007), and then using the residuals of such regression, in our sample we do not find any significant
relationship between these two variables and, thus, we consider this as a marginal issue.
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and obtained by multiplying the Gini coefficient for land distribution (landgini)
and the average amount of land per person (land).
Finally, the interactive variables between our measure of wealth distribution
and the two different measures of openness to trade are calculated simply by mul-
tiplying land inequality by each measure of openness to trade. In this case, the
land distribution variable is not the weighted one because using the unweighted
measure of distribution allows us to make more meaningful calculations of the
relationship between trade, inequality and growth. This yields the following vari-
ables: the interaction between the Gini coefficient for land and the Sachs-Warner
Index (swiland) and the interaction between the Gini coefficient for land and the
constructed trade dependency ratio (tdrland).
Figures 1 and 2 plot the general relationships between the variables of interest,
distinguishing between low and high inequality countries. To allocate each country
to one of the two groups, all countries are ranked according to their Gini coefficients
on land distribution (as set out in the Appendix).
Both figures refer to the cross-sectional data and show the association between
growth over the period 1960-2000 and the average value of the Sachs-Warner Index
or of the trade dependency ratio, respectively, over the same period. The slopes
of the best-fit lines relating growth and openness are slightly steeper for those
countries that have low land inequality than for those with high land inequality.
The intercepts of the lines are also higher for those countries that have lower land
inequality. This suggests that openness to trade has a larger positive effect on
growth in countries with lower land inequality. This effect is present for both
measures of openness to trade.
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Figure 1: Association between growth and openness (swi).
Figure 2: Association between growth and openness (tdr).
In both graphs, one can easily spot the ‘Asian Tigers’, as they are among
the most open economies and with the highest growth rates. Eliminating South
Korea and Taiwan from these graphs does not change the general pattern of the
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best-fit lines. The difference between the slopes of the low- and high-inequality
countries becomes smaller, but this exclusion is probably misleading because these
are countries that before opening to trade pursued those policies – land reforms
and increasing access to education (see, for instance, Frankema, 2006 and Galor
et al., 2004 for the case of South Korea) – that according to the present model
would increase the growth potential of an open economy.
In the following section, we analyse the relationship between openness, inequal-
ity and growth using more formal and rigorous statistical analysis to make sure
that what we observe in the above graphs is not caused by other variables. As
we will see, regression analysis confirms the general results obtained from informal
graphical analysis.
5 Openness, inequality and growth: empirical results
As predicted, the initial specification in equations (9) and (10) is not helpful: it
generates non-credible coefficients, probably because of the problems of endogene-
ity.13 The preferred specification, as discussed in Section 3, is equations (11) and
(12) for the cross-section and panel data respectively. Table 3 shows the results
obtained by estimating these equations. In each of the three pairs of columns, the
first is based on the Sachs-Warner Index of openness, and the second on the trade
dependency ratio.
While for the cross-section we use the OLS estimator with robust standard
errors to deal with possible non-normal error terms and heteroscedasticity, the
final choice for the panel data is more complex. Firstly, using the FE and RE
13The results obtained by estimating our growth model in its initial specification are available
upon request.
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estimators, the Hausman specification test shows that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are systematically similar.14 This implies that the
unobserved fixed effect is not correlated with the regressors and, thus, that the RE
and the POLS estimators are to be preferred to FE. Secondly, using the POLS and
RE estimators, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test shows that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the time-invariant part of error term
is equal to zero, i.e. there is no serial correlation. This implies that while both
estimators are consistent, the POLS estimator is more efficient and thus to be
preferred. Thirdly, using the IV POLS and POLS estimators for all the panel data
specifications, the Hausman specification test rejects the null hypothesis, implying
that both the measures of openness and education are endogenous. As a result of
these tests, table 3 includes only the results using the IV POLS estimator because
it should be consistent and efficient.15
Interpretation of results
All the specifications are significant as a whole, as shown by the F-statistics. The
regressions fit well, especially in cross-section, with more than 50 per cent of the
variation in growth explained by the relevant variables. There are differences
between the results obtained with the Sachs-Warner Index and with the trade
dependency ratio, which are in line with the expectation that the latter understates
the true extent of structural change. These differences arise statistically from
the low correlation of the two openness variables – 0.25, 0.17 and 0.15 for the
14One needs to notice that the null hypothesis may not be rejected because of the high standard
errors associated to the coefficients calculated under the FE estimator. Yet, taking into account
the steps taken to eliminate the endogeneity problems associated with this paper, it is plausible
that the null hypothesis under consideration should not be rejected.
15All the other estimations are available upon request.
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Table 3: The determinants of growth (equations (11) and (12)).
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS
swi 5.13??? 6.11??? 4.52???
(1.85) (1.68) (1.28)
tdr 3.52?? 2.37? 6.73
(1.76) (1.33) (4.90)
educ 0.26??? 0.31??? 0.20? 0.34?? 0.13 0.16
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.15)
wlandgini -0.34??? -0.35??? -0.19 -0.28? -0.31?? -0.27?
(0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
swiland -0.06?? -0.06?? -0.05??
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
tdrland -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
constant 1.72?? 1.95??? 1.96?? 3.71??? 3.62??? 2.46???
(0.82) (0.39) (0.91) (0.83) (0.92) (0.76)
Sample size 54 54 162 162 378 378
F-stat 11.00??? 8.76??? 16.98??? 11.18??? 14.31??? 8.77???
R2 0.58 0.56 0.35 0.33 0.23 0.21
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data and regional dummies are omitted. Robust standard
errors are provided in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
cross-section, the 10-year period panel data and the 5-year period panel data
respectively. Economically, following our discussion in Section 3, the differences
arise because a lowering of policy barriers to trade (a higher value of the Sachs-
Warner Index) causes structural changes that are only partly reflected in larger
trade flows, and because the ratio of trade to GDP varies for reasons that are only
partly related to structural change. Thus, in what follows, we will concentrate on
the results from the specifications using the Sachs-Warner Index, and in particular
on the 10-year panel with the IV estimator.
The coefficients on the Sachs-Warner Index are positive and highly significant
for all three specifications. This means that the more open a country is in terms of
policies, the faster its growth, which is consistent with much of the empirical liter-
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ature on the links between trade and growth. In particular, the largest coefficient
is in the specification using 10-year periods, implying that when a country opens to
trade the largest effects are manifest in the medium run. On this basis (IV-POLS,
column 3), a country that is open according to the Sachs-Warner criterion would
grow faster than one that is not by 6 percentage points every year.
Investing in more and possibly better education can also raise a country’s
growth performance. The effects are clearer in the longer run as one can see from
the the larger and more significant coefficients with the longer time periods. This
result is also in line with the empirical growth literature and it tells us that if a
country managed to raise the average level of education by 1 standard deviation it
would grow faster each year by 0.4 percentage points. For instance, if Mozambique
had managed to narrow the difference in educational level with South Africa to
half between 1960 and 2000 instead of it increasing, the growth performance of
the two countries would have been similar by the end of this period.
The coefficients on weighted land inequality are negative and significant with
only one exception (column 3), as predicted by an influential strand of the liter-
ature on the links between inequality and growth. If a country has a more equal
distribution, it is predicted to grow faster for a number of reasons, including less
distortionary redistributive politics, fewer problems with credit market imperfec-
tions that lead to credit constraints for the poor in particular, and less social and
political instability. Also, the literature often emphasises that land inequality has
an effect on growth over the long run, which is consistent with the higher coefficient
in the CS estimations.
However, these are only the direct effects of trade and inequality on growth and
this paper has argued that there are also indirect effects from openness to growth
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depending on the level of inequality in the country. Looking at the coefficients on
the interactive term between the Sachs-Warner Index and the distribution of land,
one can see that this is negative and significant in all the estimations, which means
that the less unequal the country, the higher will be its growth if it opens up to
trade. The size of the coefficient is similar across the time periods considered and
only slightly larger for the longer periods. Therefore, according to the IV-POLS
estimation using the 10-year period (column 3), the total marginal effect of the
barrier measure of trade on growth is:
∂growth
∂swi
= 6.11− 0.06 · landgini.
Based on these results, for example, one can partly explain why Malaysia, which
has higher land inequality than South Korea, has experienced lower growth even
though it opened to trade five years earlier. The difference in growth rates would
have been eliminated if Malaysia had liberalised trade with land inequality similar
to that of South Korea.
Using the trade dependency ratio instead of the Sachs-Warner Index, whose
scales are similar as shown in table 2, education and weighted land inequality
have similar coefficients, in terms of both sizes and significance. However, there
are differences in the coefficients on the measure of openness and the interactive
variable. The coefficients on the trade dependency ratio are always positive, albeit
smaller than on the Sachs-Warner Index and insignificant in the IV-POLS estima-
tion using 5-year periods. Economically, they are significant since an increase in
gross trade flows by 1 standard deviation would lead to an increase in the growth
rate of 1 percentage point. The coefficients on the interaction between the trade
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dependency ratio and land inequality are statistically insignificant in all cases, al-
beit negative and of economic significance. Based on the trade dependency ratio,
the difference in growth rates would have been halved if Malaysia had opened to
trade with land inequality similar to that of South Korea.
Robustness checks
The estimated effects of trade liberalisation on growth are twice as large when
we use the Sachs-Warner Index of trade openness rather than the trade depen-
dency ratio. Also, the interaction term between the Sachs-Warner Index and land
inequality is larger than the one between the trade dependency ratio and land
inequality. These differences are consistent with the argument in earlier sections
that the trade dependency ratio is a downward-biased measure of the true extent of
structural change caused by increased openness, of which the Sachs-Warner Index
is likely to be a more accurate measure. However, we also need to check that the
Sachs-Warner Index results are not biased upwards for other reasons, and more
generally that the results are robust.
The results do not seem to be influenced by outliers. The only countries that
could be outliers in a graph of the residuals of a regression of growth on all the
regressors except the interactive variable between trade openness and land inequal-
ity on this interactive variable are Ghana and Romania. Their exclusion alters the
coefficients in table 3 by less than 5% and only in the cross-section results.
Next, we address the concerns about the Sachs-Warner Index. First, countries
that liberalise often do so following periods of economic turmoil. Tornell (1998
in Wacziarg and Welch, 2003) showed that around 60% of episodes of economic
reform, including trade reform, occur in the aftermath of a domestic political or
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economic crisis. This would imply that pre-reform growth could be depressed due
to other factors, biasing our estimates upwards. However, this criticism does not
apply to our results because we use past values of the Sachs-Warner Index as
instruments for current values of this variable.
Second, trade liberalization may go hand in hand with other types of domes-
tic and external reforms. For instance, countries carrying out programs of trade
reform often enact at the same time policies of domestic deregulation and pri-
vatization, other microeconomic reforms, macroeconomic adjustment and capital
market liberalisation. To the extent that this is the case, our estimates may cap-
ture the impact of these other reforms rather than trade reforms. Due to our small
sample of countries, we are not able to run separate regressions with “pure” trade
reformers and overall (domestic-market) reformers. Thus, we rely on Wacziarg and
Welch (2003)’s results. They show that the estimate of the impact of trade liberal-
ization for those countries that carried out trade reforms in isolation is comparable
with the corresponding estimates for both those countries that also reformed their
domestic sectors and the overall sample of countries. Also, using data from Bekaert
et al. (2001), who examine the impact of capital market liberalization on economic
growth in a panel context, we compare their dates on financial liberalisation with
our dates of trade liberalisation. We find that out of 54 countries in our sample,
only 9 of them also opened their capital markets within 10 years before or after
trade liberalisation and that excluding these countries from our sample does not
affect our estimates in any significant way.
The issues raised in the previous paragraph may be addressed from a differ-
ent perspective. As previously discussed, the literature has often argued that
changes in the Sachs-Warner Index are correlated with changes in other policies
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conducive to faster growth and that these, in turn, are influenced by the quality
of institutions. Thus, the results obtained using the Sachs-Warner Index may be
a consequence of the correlation of this variable with an omitted regressor, such
as institutions. We ran all the regressions in Section 5 with the inclusion of an
exogenous measure of institutional quality – the log of settlers’ mortality rates,
taken from Acemoglu et al. (2001) – and we found that this does not change our
coefficients in any significant way.16 The coefficient on the log of settlers’ mor-
tality rates is negative and significant for the 10-year period regressions, which is
consistent with the literature on institutions and growth (see table 4).
These results may be criticised because we use a time-invariant measure of
institutions, which could be thought of as a fixed effect in our panel data set.
Thus, we ran the same regressions using a different measure of institutions, the
Freedom House (2007)’s Civil Liberties Index. This is the only dataset available
that goes back to 1972. The estimates on the trade openness variables and the
interaction variables are not affected, but this new institutional variable does not
have a significant effect on subsequent growth, even when it is instrumented on its
past values as for the other variables (see table 5).
Third, following Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik (1999)’s arguments, we test whether
the results obtained with the Sachs-Warner Index are driven mainly by the black
market exchange rate premium and the state monopoly of exports components.
Thus, we construct an additional dummy variable equal to 1 if a country in a
certain year has a black market exchange rate premium less than 20% – which is
16Due to the lack of availability of the log of settlers’ mortality rates for some countries, the
comparison is done with a set of regressions using only 40 countries. The only coefficient that
changes significantly is the one on average educational attainment, which becomes much smaller
and insignificant in all the regressions, which implies that the quality of institutions affects
people’s ability to acquire skills through the formal educational system.
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Table 4: The determinants of growth, including institutions (1).
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS
swi 5.45??? 5.37??? 5.34???
(1.40) (1.20) (0.88)
tdr 3.80??? 2.83??? 6.17
(1.30) (1.00) (4.33)
educ 0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.14
(0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.25)
lnmortality -0.34 -0.43? -0.61?? -0.60? -0.30 -0.42
(0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.33) (0.29) (0.28)
wlandgini -0.33?? -0.20? -0.16 -0.15 -0.33?? -0.01
(0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24)
swiland -0.06??? -0.04? -0.05???
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
tdrland -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
constant 3.05?? 2.98?? 5.13??? 4.75??? 4.56??? 3.18
(1.41) (1.30) (1.55) (1.61) (1.17) (1.96)
Sample size 40 40 120 120 280 280
F-stat 8.89??? 7.88??? 11.64??? 8.70??? 15.16??? 5.96???
R2 0.42 0.47 0.36 0.30 0.20 0.19
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data are omitted. Robust standard errors are provided in
parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients significantly different from
zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
the cutoff point considered by Sachs and Warner (1995) – and 0 otherwise. The
exchange rates are taken from Global Financial Data (2008). We then take pe-
riod averages and add this new variable and its interaction with land inequality
to our original set of regressions both with and without the Sachs-Warner Index
and its interaction with land inequality. We find that the estimates on these last
two variables are not affected and that the new variables have much lower and
insignificant coefficients on their own (see table 6). Regarding the other compo-
nents of the Sachs-Warner Index, neither the state monopoly of exports – which
was mainly used by Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1980s – nor the
socialist system dummies could be driving the results because we include in all the
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Table 5: The determinants of growth, including institutions (2).
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS
swi 5.19?? 6.01??? 5.07???
(2.00) (1.79) (1.43)
tdr 3.48? 2.58?? 2.96??
(1.78) (1.24) (1.37)
educ 0.26?? 0.33?? 0.20 0.35?? 0.17 0.28?
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.1) (0.14)
cli -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.16
(0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
wlandgini -0.34?? -0.36??? -0.16 -0.23 -0.16 -0.20
(0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
swiland -0.06?? -0.06?? -0.05??
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
tdrland -0.03 -0.05? -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
constant 1.76 1.90??? 2.03 3.31??? 2.70?? 3.66???
(1.28) (0.69) (1.34) (0.83) (1.09) (0.98)
Sample size 52 52 159 159 317 317
F-stat 8.61??? 6.59??? 16.25??? 9.90??? 13.98??? 8.54???
R2 0.57 0.51 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.24
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data and regional dummies are omitted. Robust standard
errors are provided in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
regressions a Sub-Saharan African dummy and there is only one socialist country
in our sample, Romania. Thus, the results need to be driven necessarily by the
dummies on tariff rates and the coverage of non-tariff barriers, i.e. the main trade
components of the Sachs-Warner Index.
In order to test more explicitly whether the mechanism underlying our model
and results involves access to credit, we carry out an additional check. It is im-
portant to highlight that this is based on poor data because there is no available
measure of access to credit by the poor and, thus, only marginally relevant proxies
can be used for this purpose.
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Table 6: The determinants of growth, including the black market exchange rate
premium.
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS
bmp 0.27 1.95 1.07
(1.55) (1.72) (1.68)
educ 0.25?? 0.25?? 0.16
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
wlandgini -0.35??? -0.19 -0.31??
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13)
bmpland -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
constant 3.65??? 3.04??? 4.42???
(1.13) (1.17) (1.55)
Sample size 54 162 378
F-stat 6.34??? 9.34??? 8.81???
R2 0.51 0.36 0.21
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data and regional dummies are omitted. Robust standard
errors are provided in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
We include a financial development variable in all the above regressions, by it-
self and combined with our interactive term between trade openness and inequality.
This new interactive term is calculated in two ways. In the first case, we divide
the interactive term between openness and land inequality by a continuous mea-
sure of financial development. In the second case, we replace the old interactive
term by a new dummy variable that takes value 1 when a country has both high
land inequality and low financial development and 0 otherwise. Three different
measures of financial development, all taken from Beck et al. (2000), are used –
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of private credit by deposit money
banks to GDP, and the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions to GDP. Moreover, as suggested by Levine (2005), financial
development may be endogenous, so we instrument financial development by its
32
Table 7: The determinants of growth, including financial development (1).
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS
swi -1.37 2.74 1.65
(2.32) (1.90) (1.61)
tdr 0.05 1.59 2.58
(1.13) (1.39) (2.37)
educ 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.49?? 0.14 -0.08
(0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.33)
fin 4.23 2.98 1.04 -1.80 0.03 3.24
(3.21) (1.97) (2.01) (1.84) (1.51) (1.93)
wlandgini -0.25 -0.18 -0.17 -0.01 -0.22 0.02
(0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.25)
swilandfin 0.01? 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
tdrlandfin 0.00? -0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
constant 1.22 1.14?? 1.89 2.76??? 4.01? 0.90
(1.93) (0.44) (1.46) (0.64) (2.07) (0.92)
Sample size 31 31 93 93 217 217
F-stat 8.33??? 31.67??? 10.09??? 5.93??? 6.95??? 8.54???
R2 0.61 0.71 0.34 0.30 0.19 0.19
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data and regional dummies are omitted. Robust standard
errors are provided in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
value in the preceding period, as was done for the other endogenous variables.
The new coefficients on the financial development variable and on the new
interactive variable have the predicted signs, positive and negative respectively, but
they are not significant in any of the specifications (see tables 7 and 8). However,
none of the three measures of financial development captures the financial access by
poor people, which is what one would need in order to test our theory. Moreover,
in contrast with the findings by Levine et al. (2000), financial development does
not seem to cause growth because in our smaller sample of countries we do not
include developed countries. This seems to suggest that financial development can
affect growth only after a certain level of development is reached.
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Table 8: The determinants of growth, including financial development (2).
40-year period 10-year period 5-year period
Estimation CS (OLS) CS (OLS) IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS IV-POLS
swi 2.72? 3.25?? 2.09
(1.59) (1.54) (1.31)
tdr 3.21?? 0.37 8.97?
(1.32) (1.13) (5.22)
educ 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.47?? 0.08 -0.13
(0.24) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.36)
fin -0.81 -1.16 0.26 -0.45 -0.08 -4.74
(2.71) (1.97) (1.50) (1.29) (1.19) (3.35)
wlandgini -0.24 -0.19 0.18 -0.01 -0.20 0.01
(0.31) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.31)
dswilandfin -1.94 -0.91 -1.84
(1.80) (2.07) (1.25)
dtdrlandfin -1.56 -0.88 -4.55??
(1.22) (1.12) (2.15)
constant 1.67 2.04??? 1.97 2.65??? 3.79? 2.94???
(1.85) (0.55) (1.56) (0.47) (2.13) (1.02)
Sample size 31 31 93 93 217 217
F-stat 4.01??? 5.94??? 10.01??? 4.89??? 7.29??? 6.06???
R2 0.53 0.59 0.35 0.32 0.18 0.21
Notes: Year dummies for the panel data and regional dummies are omitted. Robust standard
errors are provided in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate the coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
6 Conclusion
Drawing on theory, this paper has argued that the opportunities created in the
aftermath of a trade liberalisation are missed by the poorest in society because of
market failures, such as credit market imperfections. Therefore, unequal societies,
especially in terms of wealth, struggle much more in terms of growth performance
when the economy opens to trade. This is especially true in developing countries,
where credit market imperfections are more binding. Overall the results support
our hypothesis that opening to trade creates opportunities for higher growth as
well as adjustment costs and that countries with higher inequality are less able to
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cope with these costs and to take advantage of the growth opportunities.
This is the first empirical study to analyse whether the effects on growth of
opening to trade depend on the level of inequality of wealth, and in particular
of assets, but it will hopefully be a prelude to others. The literature has already
identified the problem. The World Bank’s book Economic Growth in the 1990s:
Learning from a Decade of Reform clearly states that “trade is an opportunity, not
a guarantee” (2005: p. 133). Also, a special study by the World Trade Organization
manifests some worries about neglecting the adjustment costs associated with trade
liberalisation (Bacchetta and Jansen, 2003). The results of trade reforms have
varied and sometimes fallen short of expectations because of failure to implement
other reforms that address binding constraints to growth.
More conclusive empirical work on this issue remains to be done: country-
specific studies using household surveys are needed to identify more directly the
channels at work and their relative importance. Jenkins (2005) goes in this direc-
tion by analysing specific value chains in four countries, which have all become
more integrated into the global economy in recent years.17 He concludes that the
effects of globalization on poverty are highly context dependent, which implies
that globalisation alone will not ensure the spreading of the benefits beyond the
already better-off. Drawing from the case study countries and, in particular, the
experience of Vietnam in recent years, Jenkins affirms that the gains from glob-
alisation are likely to be more widely distributed and the most disadvantaged in
a better position to participate in global value chains where the initial structure
of assets and entitlements is more equitable. This is indeed consistent with the
17The analysis of value chains is interesting insofar as they are driven by changes at the global
level but have impacts at the local level in terms of employment and poverty.
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theory and the results presented in this paper.
The focus of this paper has been solely on growth, but its line of reasoning
may become even more important if focused on poverty. In the words of Ravallion
(2003), “redressing the antecedent inequalities of opportunity within developing
countries as they open up to external trade is crucial to realizing the poverty-
reducing potential of globalization” (p. 20). This is confirmed by the fact that
East and South-East Asian countries have been successful at eradicating poverty
since they opened to trade, in contrast to Latin America, where poverty has been
growing (Chen and Ravallion, 2000).
In addition, the results of this study suggest that in countries characterised
by high levels of inequality in land distribution, appropriate land reforms could
be considered as an important policy option, as has been argued for the case of
Pakistan (Haq, 1997). However, considering the difficulties and the long history
of failed attempts of such reforms (El-Ghonemy, 2003), a more sensible approach
could be to improve the access of poor people to productive assets through educa-
tion, health care, and microcredit schemes, and inputs, such as irrigation (Jenkins,
2005), alongside opening to trade. This would help create more opportunities for
the poor and, in turn, for the whole society by giving everyone access to the growth
process. By the same token, participation “with voice and choice” (Birdsall and
London˜o, 1997: p. 36) of the poor can help to ensure equal access to assets that
will raise incomes in developing countries, which is, ultimately, the real challenge
facing policy makers striving for pro-poor growth.
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Appendix
A List of countries
Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea (South
Korea), Lesotho, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zam-
bia.
B Low- and high-inequality developing countries
Countries ranked as low inequality: Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Indone-
sia, Iran, Jordan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique,
Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda.
Countries ranked as high inequality: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.
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